IMPLEMENTING PDD-25 7/94 by James Ben Roth Aron (ajdx69A@prodigy.com) Order Code IB94043, CRS Issue Brief Peacekeeping and U.S. Foreign Policy: Implementing P-DD-25 Updated July 27, 1994 by Mark M. Lowenthal, Office of Senior Specialists CONTENTS: SUMMARY ISSUE DEFINITION BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS Current U.S. Peacekeeping Policy: PDD-25 Policy Implications of PDD-25 Defining U.S. National Interest Building National Consensus and the Role of Congress The U.S. Role in the U.N. PDD-25 in Action Rwanda - Yemen - Haiti - Bosnia Assessment LEGISLATION CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS FOR ADDITIONAL READING IB94043 07-27-94 MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali suggested to the Security Council that they consider withdrawing U.N. peacekeepers in Bosnia, saying only the majorpowers could enforce a peace agreement. He noted the problem of the $2 billion annual cost of the operation. Previously, referring to the prospect of peacekeepers needed for Haiti, Boutros Ghali had said the U.N. was overburdened and could neither manage nor finance this operation. BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS The dramatic increase in post-Cold War peacekeeping activities prompted the Clinton Administration to promulgate an official 'peace operations" policy, embodied in Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25). The new policy sets forth stringent criteria for various levels of U.S. participation in peacekeeping, and also raises a number of serious questions about the future international role of the United States. Current U.S. Peacekeeping Policy: PDD-25 Peacekeeping, although not specifically mentioned in the U.N. Charter, is one of the most visible and most familiar of U.N. activities. During the late-Cold War and current post-Cold War period there was a dramatic increase in these operations. Twenty-one new operations were undertaken from 1988-1994, compared with 13 for the period 1948-1987. U.S. policy towards peacekeeping has undergone rapid shifts during this same period. During the late Bush and early Clinton Administrations, U.S. peacekeeping policy was very supportive of this expansion of peace- keeping. In a Sept. 21, 1992, U.N. General Assembly speech, President Bush made a number of specific pledges of support to peacekeeping, including a variety of military roles and ways to improve U.S. financial support. Although not as specific during its early statements, the Clinton Administration also spoke positively about peacekeeping, with Secretary of State Christopher noting the need for states taking part in such operations to be more prepared to take risks. In the restructured Clinton Administration Defense Department, then-Secretary Aspin initially envisioned an Assistant Secretary for Democracy and Peacekeeping, although the nominee, Morton Halperin, was never confirmed by the Senate and the post was subsequently abolished by Secretary Perry. In February 1993, the Clinton Administration began drafting a Presidential Directive (called a Presidential Review Directive [PRD] in draft, and a Presidential Decision Directive [PDD] when signed) to define its peace- keeping policy. Internal debates and criticism from both Congress and U.N. officials prolonged the drafting and review process, and policy shifted as well, largely in response to situations in Bosnia, Haiti, and especially Somalia. Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) was finally completed and signed by President Clinton on May 3, 1994. The White House released an unclassified version. Although supporting the concept of "peace operations" (a term used to embrace the wide variety -of current peacekeeping activities) as a way of contributing to U.S. security "to prevent, contain or resolve conflicts," or as a "force multiplier" for U.S. policy, PDD-25 sets criteria for U.S. participation more stringent than those first contemplated in 1993. There are six major policy areas: 1. "Making disciplined and coherent choices about which peace operations to support." The PDD creates "three increasingly rigorous standards of review," depending on the level of U.S. involvement: (1) a Security Council vote in favor of a U.N. peace operation or U.S. support for a regionally sponsored peace operation; 2) the participation of U.S.personnel in a peace operation; 3) the possibility of U.S. participation in an operation that is likely to involve combat. The U.S. decisionmaking criteria include the relationship between the operation and U.S. interests; a possible threat to or breach of international peace; current or likely domestic and congressional support for U.S. involvement; clear mission objectives "and an understanding of where the mission fits on the spectrum between traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement;" available means in terms of forces and financing and a clear mandate; and an "anticipated duration tied to clear objectives." Finally, the PDD notes that although the United States will continue to emphasize the U.N. as the primary peacekeeping body, there will be times when regional organizations may be more appropriate. The United States will support such efforts as long as these operations adhere to U.N. peacekeeping principles and criteria, including U.N. "oversight and finite renewal mandates." 2. "Reducing U.S. costs for U.N. peace operations." The Clinton Administration is committed to reducing the U.S. share of peace- keeping costs from the current 31.7% to 25% by Jan. 1, 1996. PDD-25 also proposes a number of management reforms for the U.N. to improve efficiency and further reduce peacekeeping costs. 3. "De/ining clearly our policy regarding the command and control of American military forces in U.N. peace operations." [Emphasis in the original.) In response to the controversy surrounding this issue, the PDD "underscores the fact that the President will never relinquish command of U.S. forces." [Emphasis in the original.] U.S. forces may be placed under the operational control "of a competent U.N. commander," as has been done in the past. However, "[tlhe greater the U.S. military role, the less likely ... the United States will agree to have a U.N. commander exercise overall operational control over U.S. forces." U.S. commanders will continue to be able to report separately to higher U.S. military authorities while taking part in U.N. operations, and are specifically authorized to do so when orders "are illegal under U.S. or international law, or are outside the mandate of the mission" as agreed by the United States with the U.N. Command and operational control are two distinct military terms. Command refers to authority over all aspects of forces, including organization, use, discipline, welfare, logistics, etc. Operational control refers to the temporary authority to organize and employ forces for a specific mission, which the United States has, on occasion, given to foreign officers over U.S. forces. 4. "Reforming and improving the U.N.'s capability to manage peace operations." The PDD recommends steps to improve the capabilities of the U.N.'s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, including new divisions for plans, information and research, operations, logistics, public affairs, and civilian police; steps to reduce delays between authorization for new missions and implementation- and a pro- fessional Peace Operations Training Program for military and civilian personnel. The PDD also says the United States is willing to undertake, primarily on a reimbursable basis [emphasis in the original], "various efforts to support these initiatives, including sharing appropriate information, "while ensuring full protection of sources and methods." 5. "Improving the way the U. S. Go vernment manages and funds peace operations. The Clinton Administration has developed a doctrine of "shared responsibility" for peacekeeping management and funding. The State Department retains management and funding responsibility for those "traditional" peacekeeping operations that do not involve U.S. combat units; the Defense Department has similar responsibilities for operations likely to involve combat and for all operations in which U.S. combat units are participating. The Clinton Administration plans to seek legislation creating a new peacekeeping assessment account for the Defense Department. The United States will also seek "full reimbursement" from the U.N. for U.S. troops, goods and services. "The President may choose to waive U.N. reimbursement only in exceptional circumstances." 6. "Creating better forms of cooperation between the Executive, the Congress and theAmerican public on peace operations." This will be achieved primarily by "increasing and regularizing the flow of information and consultation" between the two branches of Government. Policy Implications of PDD-25 The stringent requirements of PDD-25 raise a number of questions about the future role of peacekeeping in U.S. foreign policy. (Some of these are treated more fully in other CRS products; see For Additional Reading.) These include: Defining U.S. National Interest The ostensibly straightforward relationship sought between proposed peacekeeping operations and U.S. national interests actually raises difficult questions; those interests -- short of direct attack -- have always been hard to define and subject to much debate. Indeed, the criterion of U.S. national interest would have been difficult to apply to most past U.N. peacekeeping operations beyond a generic U.S.interest in international peace and stability. In the post-Cold War world both the Bush and Clinton Administrations (using concepts of "new world order" and "enlargement," respectively) have had problems in achieving such a def inition of U.S. national interests that both adequately articulates those interests and wins broad congressional and public support. Building National Consensus and the Role of Congress The stringency of PDD-25 gives rise to the perception that the United States will be less willing and less likely to support future peacekeeping operations. This perception then makes it more difficult to define and defend those instances in which the United States decides that a peace- keeping operation is in the U.S. interest and raises the question of how a sufficient political consensus can be built in Congress and the public to support such a decision, despite PDD-25's pledge to improve consultation. PDD-25 recognizes the importance of congressional support for any new peacekeeping operations. Congress's role in peacekeeping decisions was a key point in the debate over joining the U.N. and the passage of the U.N. Participation Act (59 Stat. 619) of 1945. Except in cases where the United States negotiates a special agreement with the U.N. (Article 43 of the U.N. Charter), Congress does not have a specific right of approval regarding individual peacekeeping activities or operations. Congress's main means of exercising some role in peacekeeping has been through budget decisions on the U.S. contribution to the U.N. (see below). Beyond that, the War Powers Act (P.L. 93-148) offers some congressional role, requiring Presidential reports when hostilities involving U.S. forces are imminent or underway, although these reports can be and usually are ex post facto. As of June 1994, President Clinton has submitted 12 reports on peacekeeping activities "consistent with" the terms of the War Powers Act. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FYs 1994 and 1995 (P.L. 103-236, Title IV, Part A) establishes several reporting requirements to improve congressional oversight. These include: (1) a monthly "consultation" (i.e., written report) by the President to Congress on the status of U.N. peacekeeping operations, including anticipated changes to the mandate, duration, command, and control of current operations and their estimated total cost and likely U.S. share, and changes in U.S. participation and support; (2) similar information for any anticipated peacekeeping operations, including a description of the functions and estimated numbers of U.S. forces that would participate or support; (3) interim reports 5 days in advance of anticipated U.N. Security Council votes (or 3 days after the vote in "exceptional circumstances" as determined by the President) should such a vote come between required monthly reports; (4) Presidential notice 15 days in advance of U.S. assistance to U.N. peacekeeping; (5) quarterly reports on all assistance provided; (6) an annual report, at the time the budget is submitted to Congress, including a description of all U.S. assistance to peacekeeping for the previous year; aggregate and individual U.N. peacekeeping operations costs for the prior fiscal year and U.S. costs; an assessment of the effectiveness of ongoing peacekeeping operations, their relevance to U.S. national interests, the status of U.N. and other efforts to resolve the issue, and the projected termination date; the dollar value and percentage of peacekeeping contracts awarded to U.S. firms; a report on the status of U.N. reform; the status of participating military personnel under international law, including those captured missing or detained; risk to U.S. personnel who may be captured and specific steps taken to protect participating U.S. military personnel; and a description of steps taken by U.N. peacekeeping forces to promote and protect internationally recognized human rights standards. These various requirements should improve the information necessary for Congress's oversight of peacekeeping and are consonant with President Clinton's pledge in PDD-25 to improve the flow of information. They will have little effect on Congress's role in peacekeeping decisions, which will continue to rely primarily on the budget process, and they do not necessarily effect the requirement noted above to build a strong political consensus for any U.S.participation -- particularly with troops -- in new peacekeeping operations. The U.S. Role in the U.N. The new U.S. policy focuses renewed attention on a number of issues concerning the U.S. role in the U.N. Funding. The stated goals of PDD-25 to reduce the U.S. share of peacekeeping costs and to foster U.N. management reforms are consonant with long-held congressional preferences. Legislation passed in the 103rd Congress (P.L. 103-121, FY1994 State Department appropriation) continues to reflect these views. For FY1994, Congress appropriated $401.607 million for current peacekeeping operations (versus $597.744 million requested by the Administration), and no money for U.S. arrearages (versus $23.092 million requested). However, in action on the FY1995 State Department appropriation, the HouseAppropriations Committee recommended (H. Rept. 103-552) and the House agreed to the full amount requested ($533.304 million), which includes support to current peacekeeping activities and arrearages, as well as $670 million for an FY1994 supplemental. Use of Defense Department Funds. Congress has been increasingly concerned about the use of Defense Department funds to support peacekeeping, as these then are unavailable for competing defense requirements. This is especially important as many peacekeeping operations, or their likely cost or duration, cannot be foreseen during the planning stages of the U.S. budget process. In the recent past, these "incremental costs" were made up, in part, from current Defense budgets; Administration estimates for these costs for FY1994 are $1.2 billion, and it requested $300 million for FY1995. These funds were accepted in the Senate FY1995 DOD authorization bill (S. 2182), but not in the House (H.R. 4301), nor are they included in the FY1995 DOD appropriations bill as passed by the House (H.R. 4650). P.L. 103-236, Section 403 (FYs 1994-1995 Foreign Relations Authorization Act) expresses the sense of the Senate that, beginning Oct. 1, 1995, only Defense funds expressly authorized, appropriated, or approved by Congress for peacekeeping will be available for such purposes. Effect of Peacekeeping on U.S. Military Capabilities. There is concern that increased U.S. military commitments to peace- keeping may have two deleterious effects. First, as the overall size of U.S. armed forces are reduced, there is concern that remaining forces, less those detailed to peacekeeping, may not be sufficient to carry out their primary mission, defending U.S. national security interests. Second, there is concern about the effect of greater involvement in peacekeeping on combat readiness. Critics argue that the skills most important to classic peacekeeping operations-restraint and the use of force only as a last resort -- are antithetical to the training and doctrine of U.S. forces in combat, the rapid and decisive application of force. Ability to Shape Peacekeeping Operations. Even if the commitment of U.S. troops is not involved, U.S. support for any specific U.N. operations would automatically entail financial commit- ments for 25%-31.7% of the costs. Peacekeeping operations are within the purview of the Security Council, much of whose work goes on "behind the scenes" before matters are brought to a formal vote. Thus, if the United States has doubts about the propriety or overall shape of an operation, it will need to work within the Security Council to alter the operation. Signs of U.S. reluctance are bound to affect the views of other member states, who may be unwilling to make commitments in the absence of strong U.S. backing. The strong, negative British and French reactions to a May 1993 U.S. proposal for a limited U.S. air role in Bosnia while the allies had ground forces involved offer one example of such a problem. Ultimately, if the United States cannot achieve consensus on a reshaped peacekeeping operation, it may decide to veto rather than make a financial commitment to an operation it does not support conceptually. The Price of Saying "No" Following closely on the latter issue is the question of whether the United States, should it act to reduce or to veto an operation, would bear some added responsibility for subsequent events, especially should the con- ditions first prompting an interest in peacekeeping deteriorate. This has been one of the criticisms of U.S. and U.N. policy in Rwanda. In such cases, there would likely be added domestic and international pressure on the United States to reverse course, as well as increased political difficulty in doing so. The Status of U.S. Leadership Underlying all of these issues is the broader question of U.S. international leadership. To a large extent, U.S. willingness or unwillingness to act in post-Cold War international crises has been the bellwether for other nations' decisions (e.g., the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia). Some argue that, as the pre-eminent international power, the United States has less freedom to pick and choose among the peacekeeping operations it will support. This issue is made more pointed by the fact that several recent U.S. policy decisions to avoid direct involvement (Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia) have already resulted in other nations questioning U.S. international resolve. However, even those who disagree with recent U.S. decisions eschew any view of the United States as the "world's policeman," either directly or indirectly via the U.N. as a proxy. Several of the ongoing crises that may or do involve peacekeeping forces pre-date PDD-25. However, U.S. reactions to these crises give some indications of the opportunities and limits of the new policy as well as the broader issues noted above. Rwanda The ongoing crisis in Rwanda has been the first test of the new U.S. approach to peacekeeping. Ethnic warfare broke out in Rwanda between the majority Hutus & minority Tutsis in early April 1994; the U.N. estimates 250,000-500,000 dead, plus over 1.5 million refugees. A 2,500-man U.N. force (UNAMIR -- U.N. Assist- ance Mission in Rwanda; troops from Ghana, Bangladesh, and Belgium)) was already in place monitoring an earlier internal Rwandan Accord. The Security Council voted to reduce U.N-AMIR to 270, given the breakdown of peace and for their own safety. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali and African states opposed this reduction and favored reinforcing UNAMIR. This was not the first major difference of opinion between Boutros-Ghali and the United States over peacekeeping operations. There had been disagree- ments over U.S. dominance of policy and decisionmaking during the Gulf War, in Somalia and over early drafts of PDD-25 concerning the ability of U.S. forces to disregard orders from foreign officers. On May 17, 1994, the Security Council voted to increase UNAMIR to 5,500, but the United States demanded more planning before the reinforcements were actually dispatched; Ambassador Albright termed the rapid deployment of such troops into the Rwandan "maelstrom" as "folly." The United States also made it clear that its involvement would be limited to logistical support. The U.S. stance reportedly created another rift with Boutros-Ghali, who complained that he was having difficulty recruiting reinforcements. On June 8, 1994, the Security Council adopted Res. 925, which allowed the deployment of the additional forces, with the limited mission of protecting displaced people and relief workers in Rwanda. After some initial disagreements and long negotiations, the United States also agreed to lease 50 M-113 armored personnel carriers and spare parts to the U.N. for UNAMIR. The M-113s were not expected to reach Rwanda until July, after which UNAMIR forces (from Ghana and Senegal) would have to be trained in their operation. On June 22, 1994, France announced that it was sending 2,500 troops with helicopter gunships and vehicles to prevent further killing of civilians. The Security Council authorized this action that same day (Res. 929). On July 11, 1994, France informed the Security Council that its mission in Rwanda had been largely successful and that it was time to deploy the 5,500-man peacekeeping force. France intends to begin withdrawing forces at the end of July, as the peacekeepers arrive. Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, and Canada will be participating in that force. Finally, there has been controversy over the apparently official U.S. reluctance to describe the situation in Rwanda as "genocide." Critics of U.S. policy argue that the United States has avoided this term because of the 1948 Genocide convention, which mandates unspecified measures by signatory states to halt genocide once it has been detected. Administration supporters hold that various U.S. actions, including its support of U.N. steps, fulfill U.S.obligations. On July 22, 1994, President Clinton announced U.S. military support for humanitarian assistance for the Rwandan refugee crisis in Zaire. The Administration has been careful to note that this does not constitute a peacekeeping effort and defended past decisions about the level of U.S. involvement. Yemen In late April 1994, fighting broke out between North and South Yemen, formerly independent and rival nations that had united in 1990. At the urging of Arab states, the Security Council passed Res. 924 (June 1, 1994), calling for an end to the fighting, cessation of external arms supplies, and asked Boutros-Ghali to send a fact-finding mission to assess prospects for a negotiated end to the conflict. A second Security Council resolution (Res. 931, June 29, 1994) largely reiterated these terms and approved a possible international force to monitor a ceasefire. However, the resolution mentioned neither the number of monitors nor an arrival date. This was seen by some as another sign of PDD-25 in action, as the United States has preferred that Arab nations work together to resolve the Yemen problem as part of the new emphasis on regional organizations rather than relying on the U.N. as the sole arbiter. Haiti The political crisis in Haiti predates PDD-25. Nonetheless, certain aspects of U.S. policy towards Haiti -- the role of regional organizations (the OAS) and the U.N. -- are similar. The OAS imposed a trade embargo on Haiti two months after the September 1991 coup that ousted President Aristide. In response to OAS urging, the U.N. created a Special Envoy for Haiti (Dante Caputo) and sent an OAS[U.N. observer mission. Caputo brokered the June 1993 Governor's Island agreement that was supposed to pave the way to Aristide's return. The United States agreed to participate in a 1,300-man U.N. military/police observing and training team, but 200 U.S. and 25 Canadian soldiers aboard the USS Harlan County failed to land in October 1993 in the face of an angry mob. This and other signs of the Haitian military's continued intransigence has led to OAS, U.N., and U.S. economic sanctions. On May 6, 1994, the Security Council voted unanimously (Res. 917) for a nearly total trade embargo, to be enforced by military action if necessary, until the military leaders leave and Aristide is reinstated. According to press accounts, the United States has been having trouble getting other nations to contribute forces to a Haitian peacekeeping operation. Their reluctance stems, in part, from U.S. inability to state whether it plans to use force to remove the Haitianjunta. The participation of other nations is seen as important given the "unwritten" U.N. rule that peacekeeping forces deployed within a nation's sphere of influence not be dominated by that nation. Boutros-Ghali reportedly wants the United States to have no more than one-third of the 9,000-12,000-man force, which was scaled back from 12,000-14,000 in the face of recruiting difficulties. However, BoutrosGhali has now admitted that the U.N. is overburdened and cannot manage or finance another peacekeeping operation. Instead, he suggested that perhaps the Organization of American States (OAS) provide the authori- zation. The Clinton Administration indicated on July 14, 1994, that as many as 15 Western Hemisphere nations have agreed to supply between 2,000-4,000 police and trainers for a post-military restoration force. These nations include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Surinam, Belize, El Salvador, and Honduras. The United States is working within the Security Council for an explicit authorization for an invasion and the creation of a peacekeeping force once the Haitian government is restored. Bosnia The fighting in Bosnia precludes the use of peacekeepers; foreign forces already in place under U.N. auspices have been serving a humanitarian mission to ensure the arrival of needed supplies. However, the United States has pledged tip to 25,000 troops as part of a 50,000-troop NATO force to enforce any agreed-upon settlement. On July 26, 1994, Boutros- Ghali suggested that Security Council members consider withdrawing the current 35,000 peacekeeping force noting the $2 billion annual cost of the operation and saying that only the major powers could enforce any peace agreeement. Assessment As has been the case with most past peacekeeping operations, none of the major international tests of U.S. policy since the promulgation of PDD- 25 has come in an area of vital U.S. or allied interest, although Haiti stands apart given its proximity to the United States and the continuing problem of Haitian refugees. Both Rwanda and Yemen bear distinct hallmarks of the new policy: greater hesitancy to authorize or dispatch peacekeepers from nations (other than the United States) willing to supply them, and efforts to rely on regional support. There has also been criticism, especially in the case of Rwanda, where some -- including Members of Congress -- have charged that the delay in making peacekeeping decisions only prolonged the violence. PDD-25 does list "urgent humanitarian disaster coupled with violence" as one factor the United States will consider in peacekeeping decisions. Even as President Clinton announced aid for the Rwandan refugees, the Administration defended its past decisions in response to questions about why the U.N. and the United States did not act sooner. Finally, it is too soon to judge whether the broader reper- cussions that some see inherent in PDD-25, especially in terms of the United States' international position, will come into play. LEGISLATION P.L. 103-121, H.R. 2519 State Department (et al.) Appropriations for FY1994. Includes $401.607 million for current peacekeeping activities. Conference report (H.Rept. 103-293) passed House Apr. 28 and Senate Apr. 29. Signed into law Oct. 27, 1993. P.L. 103-211, H.R. 3759 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY1994. Includes $1.2 billion supplemental Defense appropriation for U.S. operations in support of peace- keeping. Signed into law Feb. 12, 1994. P.L. 103-236, H.R. 2333 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, FYs 1994 and 1995. Title IV, Part A establishes several new reporting requirements regarding U.S. participation in U.N. peacekeeping. Signed into law Apr. 30, 1994. CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Security, International Organizations and Human Rights. U.S. Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Activities. 103rd Congress, Ist session. Hearings. June 24, Sept. 21 and Oct. 7, 1993. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1994. 136 p. ---- ---- Senate. Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Coalition Defense and Reinforcing Forces. International Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement. Hearing, 103rd Congress, lst session. July 14, 1993. S. Hrg. 103-353. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1994. 74 p. ---- ----Committee on Foreign Relations. Reform of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: A Mandate for Change; a staff report. Senate, 103rd Congress, lst session. S. Prt. 103-45. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1993. 106 p. FOR ADDITIONAL READING United Nations. An Agenda for Peace. Preventive Diplomacy, Peace- making and Peace-keeping. Report of the Secretary General. [New York] June 1992. 53 p. U.S. Department of State. Bureau of International Organization Affairs. The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations.State Department Publication 10161. [Washington] May 1994. 15 p. U.S. General Accounting Office. United Nations: U.S. Participation in Peacekeeping Operations. [Washington] GAO/NSDIAD-92-247, September 1992, 70p. U.S. Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. The Clinton Foreign Policy: Emerging Themes, by Mark M. Lowenthal. [Washington] Nov. 1, 1993. 28 p. CRS Report 93-951 S ---- Global Burdensharing in the Post-Cold War World, by Stanley R. Sloan. [Washington] Oct. 8, 1993. 74 p. CRS Report 93-892 S ---- Haiti: The Struggle for Democracy and Congressional Concerns in 1994, by Maureen Taft-Morales. [Washington] (Updated regularly) CRS Issue Brief 93036 ---- Peacekeeping and Conflict Management Activities: A Discussion of Terminology, by Stanley R. Sloan. [Washington] Nov. 26, 1993. 5 p. CRS Report 93-1017 S ---- Peacekeeping in Future U.S. Foreign Policy, by Mark M. Lowenthal. [Washington] May 10, 1994. 43 p. CRS Report 94-260 S ---- Peacekeeping: Intelligence Requirements, by Richard A. Best, Jr. [Washington] May 6, 1994. 10 p. CRS Report 94-394 F ---- Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, by Nina M. Serafino. [Washington] (Updated regularly) CRS Issue Brief 94040 ---- Preventive Diplomacy: Prospects and Issues, by Mark M. Lowenthal. [Washington] Mar. 25, 1993 27 p. CRS Report 93-349 S ---- Rwanda and Burundi: Background and U.S. Policy Options, by Raymond W. Copson. [Washington] (Updated regularly) CRS Issue Brief 94027 ---- United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by Marjorie Ann Browne. [Washington] (Updated regularly) CRS Issue Brief 90103 ---- United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, 1988-1993: Background Information, by Marjorie Ann Browne. [Washington] Feb. 28, 1994. 23 p. CRS Report 94-193 F ---- U.N. System Funding: Congressional Issues, by Vita Bite. [Washington] (Updated regularly) CRS Issue Brief 86116 ---- U.S. Forces and Multinational Commands: Precedents and Criteria, by Edward F. Bruner. [Washington] Apr. 21, 1993. 6 p. CRS Report 93-436 F ---- The U.S. Military in International Peacekeeping: The Funding Mechanism, by Nina M. Serafino. [Washington] Feb. 8, 1994, 6 p. CRS Report 94-95 F ---- War Powers and U.N. Military Actions: A Brief Background of the Legislative Framework, by Ellen C. Collier. [Washington] Dec. 21, 1993. 6 p. CRS Report 93-1058 F ---- Yemen: Civil Strife, by Alfred B. Prados. [Washington] (Updated regularly) CRS Issue Brief 94042 SUMMARY U.N. peacekeeping activities have expanded dramatically in the post-Cold War world, with 21 new operations undertaken from 1988-1994 (as opposed to 13 from 1947-1988). The nature of the situations prompting these operations has changed, with many more of them coming in response to internal unrest -- including ethnic clashes -- as opposed to conflicts between nations. U.S. policy, as enunciated during the late Bush and early Clinton Admini- strations, was initially supportive of this expanded peacekeeping and made various pledges of increased U.S. military and financial support. However, as the Clinton Administration drafted a new peacekeeping policy directive (PDD-25), U.S. policy began to shift. This was caused by internal debate within the Administration on the U.S. role, and congressional and public reactions to U.S. casualties in Somalia, plus the difficult situations in Bosnia and Haiti. In May 1994, President Clinton signed PDD-25, setting forth much more stringent guidelines for U.S. support of or participation in peacekeeping than contemplated in early 1993. The PDD also pledges to reduce the U.S. share of U.N. peacekeeping costs from 31.7% to 25%, seeks further U.N. reforms, allows U.S. troops to serve under foreign operational control but not command, clarifies U.S. internal responsibility for peacekeeping, and pledges improved information to Congress and the public. PDD-25 raises a number of broad questions about the role of peacekeeping in future U.S. foreign policy, including: how to define U.S. national interests as they relate to peacekeeping; how to build the necessary congressional and public support for future participation in peacekeeping -addressed, in part, in P.L. 103-236, which sets forth new reporting requirements related to U.S. peacekeeping policy; the role of the United States in the U.N. -- including the U.S. share of peacekeeping costs, the use of Defense Depart- ment funds for peacekeeping, the effect of peacekeeping on U.S. military capabilities; and the overall status of U.S. international leadership. The tests of the new policy, to date, have not come in areas seen as being vital to U.S. interests. The first display of the new U.S. peacekeeping policy has been in Rwanda, where the United States supported expansion of the current U.N. force (UNAMIR) but voted to delay their deployment, and limited U.S. support to the lease of 50 armored personnel carriers. In Yemen, the United States has supported a regional approach to the conflict. In Haiti, the United States has imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions both unilaterally and through the U.N., but the U.N. now says it cannot manage or finance peacekeepers for Haiti.